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Quality management and safety culture in medicine – Do
standard quality reports provide insights into the human
factor of patient safety?
QualitätsmanagementundSicherheitskulturinderMedizin–Findetder
„Human Factor“ für Patientensicherheit Berücksichtigung in
standardisierten Qualitätsberichten?
Abstract
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the landmark report
“To err is human: building a safer healthcare system” highlighting crit-
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ical deficiencies within the area of patient safety. As a consequence,
safety culture evolved as a core component of quality management in
medicine. Purpose of the investigation at hand was to find out to what 1 UMIT – University for Health
Sciences, Medical extent this is reflected in standard quality reports issued by German
Informatics and Technology,
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hospitals providing maximum medical care. Reports issued for the year
2006 were analysed with respect to the appearance of indicators for
the presence of a safety culture. Results suggest that despite the huge
awareness for patient safety caused by the IOM report, the topic of
safety culture does not get the anticipated attention within the quality
reports. This may indicate that the current requirements for the quality
reportsdonotfacilitatetransparencywhenitcomestothehumanfactor
of patient safety.
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quality management, quality report
Zusammenfassung
Mit der Publikation von „To err is human: building a safer health care
system“ hat das Institute of Medicine (IOM) 1999 in den USA auf
grundlegende Mängel in Zusammenhang mit Patientensicherheit auf-
merksam gemacht. In der Konsequenz ist Sicherheitskultur zu einem
essentiellenTeildesQualitätsmanagementsgeworden.Dievorliegende
UntersuchungbeschreibtdieAnalysevonQualitätsberichtendeutscher
Krankenhäuser der Maximalversorgung für das Jahr 2006 hinsichtlich
desAuftretensvonIndikatorenfürdasVorhandenseineinerSicherheits-
kultur. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass relativ zur großen Aufmerksamkeit
für den Bericht des IOM und damit verbunden für Sicherheitskultur,
dieses Thema noch unterrepräsentiert ist in der Dokumentation von
Qualität. Eine mögliche Ursache dafür könnte in der fehlenden Spezifi-
kation von Anforderungen für einen Standard bezüglich des „Human
factor“ und der Patientensicherheit liegen.
Schlüsselwörter: Sicherheitskultur, Fehlerkultur, Fehlerelastizität,
Patientensicherheit, Qualitätsmanagement, Qualitätsberichte
Introduction
With the publication of “To err is human: building a safer
health care system” and an estimate of up to 98.000
death per year due to treatment errors, the Institute of
Medicine in 1999 not only highlighted substantial defi-
ciencies in patient care but also raised public awareness
for the meaning of patient safety for quality in medicine
[1].Duringthefollowingyearsthisreporttriggeredvarious
international projects at the World Health Organization
(WHO–WorldAllianceonPatientSafety),theOrganization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD –
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Union (European Commission on public health –
SImPatIE: Safety improvement for patients in Europe),
with the common objective to improve patient safety. In
line with a core postulation of the IOM report, safety cul-
tureisincludedasanintegralpartintothescopeofthese
initiatives. The most recent international project, the
European Network for Patient Safety (EuNETPaS), a col-
laboration of all 27 EU-countries also mentions “promot-
ing a culture of patient safety” as one of 5 focus areas
and puts it first on its list of priorities. Taken together, it
is well recognized that safety culture is pivotal for quality
in medicine and that “patient safety encompasses…the
attributes of organizations that help guard against harm
and enable rapid recovery when risk escalates” [2].
Background
Generally spoken, the term “safety culture” refers to an
“organizational culture focused on safety objectives”.
Even though “safety culture” is a widely and frequently
used term, so far no common definition of it exists [3].
“Researchers tend to use safety culture, safety climate
andperhapssafetymanagementinterchangeably,asthe
terms are not so clear cut” [4]. According to the
“European Society for Quality in Health Care” safety cul-
tureisdefinedasfollows:“Cultureofsafety:anintegrated
pattern of individual and organizational behavior, based
upon shared beliefs and values, that continuously seeks
to minimize patient harm which may result from the pro-
cesses of care delivery” [5]. In German, it is common
practice to also use the word “error culture” analogue to
safety culture. Taking the definition provided by the
“Physicians centre for quality in medicine” as a basis,
“errorculture”representsarevisedmanagementoferror
awayfromasuperficialreactivecultureofblametowards
a system oriented proactive safety culture [6]. Along this
line, the German “Advisory Council for the Concerted Ac-
tioninHealthCare”demandssystematicandprospective
error management to become an attribute for quality in
medicine (new error culture) which can overcome the
notion of physician's infallibility, and the tendency to
search for a single guilty individual [7].
DonaldBerwickindicatedalreadyin1989thata“Theory
of bad apples” is improper to address issues in quality
and to support continuous improvement in health care
[8]. Instead, the phenomenon of “human error” in medi-
cine does require a far more sophisticated view which,
based on the work by J. Reason, needs to differentiate
between active failures of individuals and latent condi-
tionshiddenwithintheorganization.Hisconceptofsafety
cultureisbasedonattitudes,values,andbeliefsofpeople
supported by appropriate infrastructure to manage data
and system information [9]. Findings from investigations
into real world examples like the “Bristol Royal Infirmary
Inquiry” provide further evidence that “the culture of the
futuremustbeacultureofsafetyandofquality;aculture
of openness and of accountability; … a culture in which
collaborative teamwork is prized” [10].
All together, the acceptance for applying human factor
theory and system thinking to quality management in
medicinehasdramaticallyincreasedoverthelastdecade,
a fact that is reflected in the following statement of the
InsituteofMedicine:“Morecommonly,errorsarecaused
by faulty systems, processes and conditions that lead
people to make mistakes or fail to prevent them” [11]
This is also in line with Schrappe, who demands the
integration of safety culture into the self-image of hos-
pitals [12].
Anorganization’ssafetyculturecanbeevaluatedbyusing
specific questionnaires. In addition, the presence of
incident reporting systems, specific measures like crew
resourcemanagementorhighreliabilitytrainingsadopted
fromhighreliabilitytheoryandotheractivitiesinconjunc-
tionwithriskorerrormanagementcanbeusedasimplicit
(indirect)indicatorsfortheexistenceofacultureofsafety
[13], [14], [15]. Mearns et al. are referring to indirect in-
dicators as a source of information about safety culture
and argue: “The extent to which these factors are found
to be in tune with each other may determine whether or
not an organization has a positive safety culture” [16].
From a regulatory point of view, the German Health Care
Reform2000alreadyincludedcomprehensivemeasures
for quality assurance in hospitals. The following “Fall-
pauschalengesetz (DRG law)” in 2002 obligates all ac-
credited hospitals to publish biannual quality reports
(initially in 2005 for the prior year 2004) based on com-
mon standards. Objectives and metrics used in these
quality reports were determined by the federal joint
committee in 2004 and documented in the “Declaration
accordingto§137Abs.1Satz3Nr.1SGBVonthebasic
requirements for a quality management for hospitals ac-
credited in compliance with § 108 SGB V”. The aim of
the quality reports is to provide patients, sick funds, and
referring physicians with orientation regarding health
servicesofferedandtheircorrespondingquality.Further-
more, quality reports are expected to promote compar-
ability between individual hospitals in relation to major
quality dimensions [17]. While not demanding pre spe-
cified activities for risk and error management, both are
mentioned explicitly in the outline for the quality reports
issued by the “Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss”.
Given that safety culture has been identified and widely
accepted as a major contributor to quality in medicine,
one would expect documentation on this matter within
hospital quality reports. However, as of today there is no
knowledge to what extent these reports provide insights
into the status quo of safety culture in Germany. The aim
of the research at hand therefore is to analyze the 2006
hospital quality reports with respect to their informative
value about the extent to which safety culture did find its
way into routine quality management efforts. Based on
that, first and of course preliminary conclusions on the
awareness for the importance of safety culture as a key
component of quality management in German hospitals
are drawn.
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Aninitialassessmentofthequalityreportswasperformed
by using safety culture, error culture and error manage-
ment as search items in order to gain an understanding
for the prevalence of explicit mentioning of safety culture
and related concepts within the quality reports. Mortality
and morbidity conferences, while not named specificly in
the context of safety culture, were also included in the
initial assessment, acknowledging their long tradition in
assessing outcomes and treatment related adverse
events including potential error [18].
In a second step a literature research was conducted in
order to identify indicators which either allow for directly
measuring safety culture (direct indicators), or which
qualifyasimplicitmeasures(indirectindicators)forsafety
culture [19], [20].
As a result of this, the following methods for the direct
assessment of safety culture were identified (e.g. [20]):
• ORMAG – Operating room management attitudes
questionnaire
• SAQ – Safety attitudes questionnaire
• SLOAPS – Strategies for leadership: An organizational
approach to patient safety
• PSCHO – Patient safety cultures in healthcare organi-
zations
• VHA PSCQ – Veterans administration patient safety
culture questionnaire
• HSOPS – Hospital survey on patient safety
• CSS – Culture of safety survey
• SCS – Safety climate survey
• MSSA – Medication safety self assessment
• HTSSCS – Hospital transfusion service safety culture
survey
• HSPSC – Hospital survey on patient safety culture
• MaPSaf – Manchester patient safety framework
Indirect indicators for safety culture can be divided into
toolsfororganizationaldevelopment/teamworkandmore
technical tools for capturing or analyzing data related to
incidents. For the first category the literature search
yielded to the following findings (e.g. [21], [22]):
• CRM – Crew resource management
• ACRM – Anaesthesia crisis resource management
• TOMS – Team oriented medical simulator
• HRT – High reliability teams
Technical tools to collect safety relevant data are:
• CIRS – Critical incident reporting system [23]
• ICUSRS – ICU safety reporting system [24]
• CIRS medical – Reporting system AEZQ
(http://www.cirsmedical.de/)
• PaSIS – Patient safety information system [25]
• PaSOS – Patient safety optimization system
(https://www.pasos-ains.de/indexSSL.php)
• CIRSDGCH–http://www.dgch.de/de/cirs/index.html
Complementary to these data management applications
used for incident reporting, a number of risk and error
analysis tools exist which can also serve as indirect indi-
catorsfortheexistenceofsafetyculture.Intheliterature,
the following tools are mentioned:
• FMEA – Failure mode and efficiency analysis [26]
• FTA – Fault tree analysis [26]
• RCA – Root cause analysis [27]
• ERA – Error and risk analysis [28]
• HRA – Human reliability analysis [29]
• HAZOP – Hazard and operability study [30]
• SHERPA – Systematic human error reduction and
prediction approach [30]
• PHA – Proactive hazard analysis [31]
• HFMEA – Healthcare failure mode and effect analysis
[31]
• HACCP – Hazard analysis and critical control points
[31]
• HVA – Hazard vulnerability analysis (Joint commission
on accreditation of healthcare organizations 2002,
http://www.jointcommission.org/)
The direct as well as the indirect indicators for safety
culture served as a basis for the analysis-matrix that was
compiled to evaluate the quality reports with respect to
the appearance of indicators for safety culture.
In order to identify chapters relevant for “safety culture”
the standard structure of the reports was reviewed. The
reportsthemselvesaredividedinto4subsections.Whilst
chapter A and B are concentrated on structural and pro-
cedural data (e.g. number and type of wards, number of
beds, number of specific interventions…), chapter C
(measures and projects on quality assurance in the hos-
pital)andD(internalqualitymanagement,e.g.systematic
strategiesandmeasurestosupportcontinuousimprove-
ment) are explicitly focused on the documentation of the
implementation of quality management in hospitals.
ConsequentlyonlychaptersCandDofthequalityreports
were analyzed in terms of their reference to direct and
indirectindicatorsofsafetyculture.Figure1summarizes
the signal steps of the methodological procedure.
To minimize any potential for selection bias due to dis-
ease specialization only quality reports of hospitals
providing maximum medical care (N=96, source: IMS
2007) were considered. Since the presented data are
basedonananalysisofpublishedqualityreportsandnot
on information collected specificly on safety culture in
the hospitals themselves, conclusions on the current
distribution of safety culture within the present paper re-
mainpreliminaryandhavedobeinterpretedwithprecau-
tion.
Results
Figure 2 shows the results of the initial search within the
qualityreportsusingthekeywords“safetyculture”,“error
culture”, “error management” and “morbidity/mortality
conferences”.
AscanbeseeninFigure2,onlyseven(7%)ofallhospitals
explicitly mentioned “safety culture” as an integral part
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Figure 2: Frequency of occurence for any of the key words within the sample (multiple occurrence per institution possible)
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were documented in hospitals with incident reporting)
Figure 4: Frequency of safety/error culture mentioned in hospitals with incident reporting systems
oftheirqualityassurance.Bothothersearchterms,“error
culture” (14 hospitals/15%) and “error management”
(32 hospitals/33%), were represented more frequently.
Most commonly mentioned terms were “morbidity/mor-
talityconferences”withafrequencyof44%(42hospitals).
31 hospitals or 32% of the sample did not refer to any of
thesesearchitems.Thedistributionofdirectandindirect
indicators according to the analysis matrix is shown in
Figure 3.
AccordingtotheresultspresentedinFigure3,evaluation
of safety culture as a direct measure based on specific
questionnaires was not mentioned in any of the quality
reports. Among the indirect indicators incident reporting
systems turned out as the most prominent tool and were
listed in 47 hospitals or 49% of the quality management
reports as part of the quality assurance efforts. Only two
hospitals(2%)arenamingspecificriskmanagementtools
in their reports. None of the investigated quality reports
did refer to teamtraining activities identified as indirect
indicators for safety culture. More than half of the re-
viewed reports (49 or 51%) did not make reference to
any of the listed indicators for safety culture.
Matching the mentioning of CIRS against the explicit ref-
erence to safety culture within the quality reports lead to
the following result: Amongst hospitals which use re-
porting systems a significant proportion (66%) did not
explicitlyadress“safetyculture”or“errorculture”intheir
quality report (Figure 4).
Discussion
Along with the DRG legislation 2002 went the decision
to introduce standardized quality reports for German
Hospitals. With respect to structural data and simple
quantifiableparameters,suchasanoutlineoftheoverall
organization, number of beds, number of patients, fre-
quency of specific interventions, the documentation in-
structions issued by the “Federal joint committee” in
2004 are characterized by a high degree of clarity and
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managementrelevantchaptersC(qualityassurance)and
in particular D (quality management) are less explicit in
terms of information mandatory to be included. As a
consequence,thecontentofthesechapters,inparticular
chapter D, comprises much more of individual initiatives
by hospitals than of documentation standards which
would allow for benchmarking implemented measures
with prespecified reference values.
Our analysis revealed an incidence of 7% for the term
“safety culture”, or a total incidence of 20% when con-
sidering the synonym “error culture” within the quality
reports of the investigated sample. Compared to the
combinedfrequencyofoccurrenceof20%forthesearch
terms safety/error culture, the appearance of the more
general term “error management” was higher with 33%
indicating an overall awareness for the need to adress
errorinatleastonethirdofthehospitals.Mostfrequently
thelattertermwasmentionedinassociationwithincident
reporting systems and/or the use of mortality and mor-
bidity conferences. None of the other indirect indicators
for safety culture turned out to play a significant role in
this sample. From the authors' point of view, this finding
may imply that the information value of the reports with
respect to the issue of safety culture is not sufficient. At
the same time, it seems plausible to conclude that the
basic requirements from the IOM report did not evoque
an unsolicited or sustainable response in the sense of
documented activities related to safety culture for the
majority of investigated hospitals.
Onecouldarguethatthefrequentmentioningofincident
reportingproofsthelatterhypothesiswrong,inparticular
since available evidence on the use of critical incident
reporting systems (CIRS) suggests that “high reporting
rates may be indicators of a positive safety culture” [32].
However, even in the category of hospitals mentioning
CIRS or any other reporting system 31 out of 47 (66%)
neither refer to safety culture nor to error culture in their
quality reports. As a consequence, it remains unclear
whetherornottheintroductionofCIRSwasaccompanied
by an awareness for the meaning of safety culture or not.
This is of special importance since available evidence
indicates that incident reporting systems tend to remain
ineffective when implemented as an isolated measure
[33], [7], [34]. Along the same line Barach et al. state
that“managementattitudesandinstitutionalclimatecan
greatly influence the success or failure of reporting ef-
forts” [35]. Aside from the predominantely missing refer-
ence to safety culture, any referral to compliance with
the incident reporting systems or information on the fre-
quency of incidents being documented was lacking.
Without that information, there is no reliable foundation
for using the acceptance of documenting incidents as a
signforsafetycultureorforbenchmarkingtheimplemen-
tation across different hospitals based on the quality re-
ports.
The frequent mentioning of morbidity and mortality con-
ferences as a more traditional approach for assessing
performance and outcomes can also not reduce the im-
pression of a limited awareness for the concept of safety
culture. While these conferences can be seen as an am-
bition to investigate causes of error, it needs to be taken
intoconsiderationthattheydosufferfromsomepotential
limitations. In particular, a narrow focus on individual
performance rather than system thinking as well as
hindsight bias and search for error instead of focusing
on error promoting conditions are to be mentioned as
weaknesses of that tool [36]. Further constraints are
caused by the high variance in the understanding of how
to adequately perform morbidity and mortality confer-
ences.ThisfactisstressedbyAboumataretal.according
to whom “there is wide variation in how morbidity and
mortalityconferencesareconductedacrossdepartments
and little conformity to known models for analyzing
medical incidents” [37].
Apossibleexplanationforthepoorconsiderationofsafety
cultureanditsdirectandindirectindicatorswithinquality
reports may be that the prevailing understanding of
quality is still based on a perception of error as an event
happeningatthesharpend,whilelatentorsystem-based
issues remain in the background. This interpretation is
supported by the fact that none of the investigated hos-
pitals reported specific measures on teamtraining within
thecontextofsafetyandriskmanagement.Similarly,any
mentioningofquestionnairesforasystematicevaluation
ofsafetycultureismissing.Anotherpotentialexplanation
for this observation might be a preference to focus on
quantifiable measures. Opportunities for improvement
above and beyond the focus on numerical metrics was
alreadyexpressedinastudybeiGeraedtsetal.whowere
looking at patient and physician opinion of the reported
qualityindicators[38].Inlinewiththat,Reasonhighlights
that “the corollary in healthcare institutions is a singular
focus on critical numerical indices. Hospital managers
live by numbers but they do not always appreciate their
limitations”[34].Cultureasasoftfactorforperformance
is less tangible and carries an element of uncertainty
which people may want to escape through hiding them-
selves behind numerical metrics.
All in all, the findings from the analysis at hand are com-
parable to the results of the “Krankenhausbarometer
2008” . According to that survey, about 31% of all hos-
pitals in Germany do use at least to some extent some
sort of risk management systems. That number fits well
with the identified 33% of hospitals referring to error
managementintheirqualityreportsinthepresentstudy.
However,the“Krankenhausbarometer”doesnotmention
“safety culture” at all. Apart from that, according to the
“Krankenhausbarometer 2008”, the most frequently re-
ported tool mentioned within the context of risk manage-
mentwascomplaintsmanagement(90.9%ofallhospitals
with risk management) [39]. This high reliance on com-
plaintsmanagementisthought-provoking,sinceprevious
research suggests that the reliability of patient informa-
tion on medical error is rather limited, an issue which is
raised by Tanne with reference to study findings: “More
than half the incidents reported by patients were prob-
lems with the service rather than medical error” [40]. In
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anindicatorforeffortsregardingpatientsatisfactionthan
efforts for patient safety.
Theprecedinganalysisleadsustothenotionthatdespite
all efforts, the matter of safety culture has not reached
alevelofawarenesswhichautomaticallywouldtranslate
into explicit reference and/or corresponding strategies/
tactics in standard quality reports in Germany. In view of
thehighrelevanceofthehumanfactorforsafetyinhealth
care, it seems to be critically important to substantially
improvethecontentofthequalityreportsthroughspecify-
ing requirements on risk and error management and in
particular to offer a framework for establishing safety
culture. A concrete example for that is provided by “The
Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organ-
izations (JCAHO)” in the US, who integrated an annual
assessment of safety culture in 2007 in their objectives
on patient safety. Further guidance could also be taken
fromtheNHSintheUKbasedontheworkoftheNational
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). Building a safety culture
is the first step in their program “Seven steps to patient
safety” and corresponding tools for implementation are
availableonline(http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/
collections/seven-steps-to-patient-safety/
?entryid45=59787).
InlinewiththefinalreportfromtheSymPaTIEprojectthe
authors of the present paper conclude that it can be
considerdindisputablethat“Patientsafetymanagement
is a clear distinguishable, but inseperable part of our
quality management system, that should be part of our
normalmanagementandleadershipsystem,bothprofes-
sional and managerial” [41]. This in mind only the com-
bination of technical skills with an appropriate safety
culture acknowledging human failability and favouring
patient safety will translate into error elasticity [42] as a
concept for preventing harm to patients.
In light of this, a revision of the current requirements for
the quality reports issued by German hospitals might be
worth to be considered. As stated by the Institute of
Medicine: “Setting and enforcing explicit standards for
safety through regulatory and related mechanisms, such
as licensing, certification, and accreditation, can define
minimumperformancelevelsforhealthcareorganizations
and professionals” [10].
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